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Abstract 
     This study aims mainly at analyzing the reality of the Iranian-Turkish competition to expand their political 
and military influence in Syria. To achieve the objectives of the study and to answer its question, the study seeks 
to verify the following hypothesis: There is a correlation between the Turkish and Iranian political interests in 
Syria. The study concluded that Iran seeks to strengthen the power of the Syrian regime and its role in Syria at 
the expense of the Syrian opposition supported by Turkey, which seeks to reduce the Kurds in northern Syria. 
The conflict in Syria has given a definite shape to the relations between Turkey and Iran. The Syrian crisis has 
contributed to the spread of Iranian-Turkish relations according to the differences over the crisis. It is possible to 
say that the events of the "Arab Spring" in general and the Syrian events in particular have produced a complex 
geo-strategic reality in the Middle East region, which has emerged mainly in the competition between Turkey 
and Iran. 
Introduction: 
  Turkey has sought to strengthen its regional position by making it eligible to act as a mediator in the Middle 
East by playing an active regional role in the Arab region after its chances of joining the European Union have 
declined and started heading south towards the Arab region, according to purely Turkish calculations. According 
to the Turkish foreign policy architect, Dao wood Oğlu, in his book "Strategic Depth" in which he expressed his 
firm convictions that his country has a strategic position and qualities that qualifies it to play a more active role 
in international politics than a bridge between East and West. Leave the ambition in the region that made 
observers describe them as "neo-Ottoman," while Iran has developed regional tools brilliantly after the collapse 
of the regional system taking advantage of regional alliances and its geographical location overlooking the 
Arabian Gulf and its ability to disrupt the passage of oil to world markets in addition to the ideological 
dimension of sectarian. According to this scenario, after more than a quarter century of Islamic revolution in 
1979, Iran became the sectarian authority in the world, and on this basis all the armed operations of the sectarian 
groups became in Iran's regional interests and because of the absence of a clear Arab project, only two projects 
remained in the region. The first American that aims to impose a new Middle East under Israeli leadership. The 
second is a new Middle East, but an Iranian (sectarian) one. 
  The Turkish-Iranian conflict is due to the imposition of influence and domination over Syria to ancient 
historical stages, due to geographical proximity and strategic importance of its location in the Arab region. 
Syrian-Iranian relations have been a strategic alliance since the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1989. 
Turkey and Iran have different positions in the conflict in Syria. While Iran supports the Syrian regime and Iran 
succeeded militarily in controlling areas controlled by the Syrian regime, Turkey supported the Syrian opposition 
and conducted military operations in northern Syria, but the Russian-Turkish understanding on finding a way out 
of the Syrian crisis made Turkey is a stronger position despite the fact that Iran continues to emphasize that its 
militias will not leave Syria and the significance of the Iranian-Turkish rivalry in the light of developments in the 
conflict in Syria. This study is intended to clarify the nature of Iranian-Turkish influence in Syria during the 
period 2011-2017. 
  The problem of the study: The Arab region has undergone important strategic changes since the US occupation 
of Iraq in 2003 and the events of the Arab Spring 2011, which contributed to the emergence of the influence of 
the international and regional forces of Turkey and Iran. Where the two countries are competing to expand their 
influence in the Arab region in light of the weakness of the Arab regional system and the ongoing developments 
witnessed by most Arab countries. Turkey and Iran are two regional powers that are rising. Their interests extend 
beyond their geographical borders, in light of the intertwined areas of influence between them, especially in Iraq 
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and Syria .Thus, this issue highlights the problem of the current study in its attempt answer the following main 
question: 
   What are the nature and forms of Iranian-Turkish rivalry and influence in the reality and developments of the 
political conflict in Syria during the period (2011-2017)? 
  The importance of the study: The practical importance of this study is what can be added to the process in this 
area and contribute to the analysis of the dimensions of Iranian-Turkish competition in Syria .The analysis will 
contribute to increase the awareness of decision makers in the Arab countries of the risks of competition between 
them on the future of conflict in Syria. 
Objectives of the study: The study aims mainly at analyzing the reality of the Iranian-Turkish competition to 
expand their political and military influence in Syria. 
   Hypothesis of the study: To achieve the objectives of the study and answer its question, the study seeks to 
verify the following hypothesis: There is a correlation between Turkish and Iranian political interests in Syria 
and the positions of the states of the developments of the political conflict in Syria during the period (2011-
2017). 
Methodology of the study: 
  The study is based on the comparative analysis method. This method is considered one of the most descriptive 
studies. Most of the descriptive studies reveal the nature of the phenomenon and the interpretation of the 
available information. Comparative or analytical comparative studies attempt to explain how and where the 
phenomenon occurs. The main objective of this study is to understand which variables are the cause 
(independent variable) and which is the result (dependent variable) of a particular phenomenon (Kalalda, Jouda, 
dt): 201). The Comparative analysis is an important part of any scientific study in any science (1987: 17). The 
researcher relied on this approach to analyze and compare the nature and tools of Iranian-Turkish competition to 
expand their influence in Syria. 
Terminology of study: 
  Iran's strategy: the "20-year-old Iranian strategy" (2005-2025), an official document that set out future visions 
of the Iranian role in 20 years. According to this strategy, Iran is supposed to enjoy international privacy and 
become an international force and inspiration for the Muslim world, (Baztab, 2005: 12). For the purposes of this 
study, the researcher defines Iranian strategy in Syria as the Iranian plan to support and enhance Iranian 
influence in Syria by providing financial and military support to the Syrian regime (Bashar al-Assad regime). 
  The Turkish strategy: The Turkish strategy aims to expand the "fan of its options" in the face of attempts to 
isolate it (Bakeer, 2013). For the purposes of this study, the researcher defines Turkish strategy as representing 
programs and plans with specific goals, Turkey in the Arab region from a perspective based on mutual interests, 
interdependence and economic interests. 
The term Competition is a process of interaction that accompanies the preparation of a political decision, an 
activity in which two or more parties seek to achieve the same goal. Thus, competition varies as much as from 
one society to another and within one society (Kadiri, 2007: 20).For the purpose of this study, the researcher 
defines competition as a level of conflict between Iran and Turkey to enhance their role in the political conflict in 
Syria. 
   The term Syrian crisis: the events began in the city of Daraa where the security (according to the story of 
opposition activists) arrested 15 children; following slogans calling for freedom and demanding the overthrow of 
the regime on the wall of their school on 26 February 2011. In the midst of that , there was a call to demonstrate  
o a page  in Face book  that wasn’t know who  was behind it, a group of activists responded to it  on Tuesday, 
March 15, 2011  who protested  against tyranny, repression and corruption and suppression of freedoms, the 
arrest of the children of Daraa, and the humiliation suffered by their parents, according to the Syrian opposition, 
while the supporters of the regime It  was a conspiracy against the axis of resistance and Arab reluctance (Abdel 
Ghaffar, 2015: 83). 
Variables of the study: 
  The Independent variable: A set of motives and variables that stimulate Turkish-Iranian competition in Syria. 
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 The dependent Variable: reality and future of Iranian-Turkish rivalry in Syria 2011-2017. 
The Previous studies: 
The most important studies related to the subject of the study are the following: 
 The Arabic Studies: 
  A study of ADMI (2014) entitled "The Turkish-Iranian  competition over the Areas of Influence in the Middle 
East, 1996-2014." The study aimed to demonstrate the Turkish-Iranian rivalry and the most competitive areas of 
influence in the Middle East. The study showed that because of the importance of this region, the competition 
was intensified between the two countries after the events of September 11, 2001 and the collapse of Saddam 
Hussein's regime in 2003, to extend their influence in the region and to use all their historical, geographic and 
cultural data to confirm their interdependence and to demonstrate their model as the most appropriate and ideal 
model. Then, the Arab movement started, where this competition was explained clearly, especially after the 
movement of Syria and contrasts the position of both Iran and Turkey. The first is a supporter of the system and 
the second is defender of the popular movement of the Syrian and tucked the Syrian opposition, and this is what 
sharpened the relationship between the two countries. 
  The Study of the Al Edwan (2013), entitled the Regional Strategy for Turkey and Iran towards the Middle East 
during the period 2002-2013. The study aimed at identifying the main aspects of the regional strategy of Turkey 
and Iran in the Middle East for the period 2002-2013, Regional, and international levels on the nature of their 
regional strategies in the Middle East. The study started from the hypothesis that "the local, regional and 
international environmental factors contributed to the formation of the regional strategy of Turkey and Iran in the 
Middle East for the period 2002-2013. The study concluded that the local, regional and international 
environmental factors contributed to the formation of the regional strategy of Turkey and Iran in the Middle East 
for the period 2002-2013. The study recommended on  formulating an Arab strategy to deal with international 
and regional changes and intensifying cooperation and coordination efforts in international and regional forums 
in order to address sectarian, ethnic and ethnic trends in the Iranian project. 
  Bakeer study (2013), entitled: The Geostrategic Dimensions of the Iranian and Turkish politicians towards 
Syria. This study aimed at searching in the background of the Iranian and Turkish positions of the Syrian 
revolution, the motives and reasons associated with their projects in the Arab region and the implications of their 
policy on them. The study concluded that Syria occupies a geostrategic position in the region; The Fertile 
Crescent is of great importance, especially for the Iranian and Turkish projects. A small number of countries 
have geographical sections open to distant but interactive geopolitical dimensions, in addition to being a 
transport complex and an intersection of influence in the Fertile Crescent region to the east, west, north and 
south. In addition to being with front boarders with Israel, which gave it great importance. All of this has 
allowed  them to play an important role in the Fertile Crescent region. 
Foreign Studies: 
Larabi's study, Alireza (2015), 
Entitled: Turkish-Iranian relations in the Middle East are changing 
  The study showed that Turkish-Iranian cooperation has increased significantly. Turkey's need for energy, oil 
and natural gas resources in Iran which has been an important factor in increasing Turkish-Iranian cooperation. 
Iran is the second largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey after Russia. Iran is also an important source of crude 
oil. However, the degree of cooperation between the two countries should not be overstated. Historically, Turkey 
and Iran have been competing rather than being close partners. While they may share certain economic and 
security interests, their interests run counter to many levels throughout the Middle East. The two countries have 
different political identities as well as radically different ideologies. 
The study by Catherine Brown et al. (2011) 
United: The United States of America, Turkey and Iran: Strategic Options for the Next Decade 
  It is an eight-pronged English study, began with a brief study of Turkish-Israeli relations and attempted to 
understand the reality of Turkish-Iraqi relations, the role of Turkey I NATO, in addition to nuclear weapons 
issues in the Middle East, as well as the issue of politicizing oil in the Middle East 
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What distinguishes this study from previous studies? 
  The previous studies presented topics within the framework of the present study regarding the Iranian and 
Turkish attempts to try to intervene directly in the Arab region. The study is characterized by the fact that it 
examines the competition and conflict between Turkey and Iran as regional powers that play an influential role 
in the Arab region. As it presents the development in the Iranian-Turkish regional competition in a systematic 
way between the two countries, and the variables dealt with in the current study have not been linked and dealt 
with in previous studies. 
First: The Regional determinants of Iranian and Turkish policy in the Arab region: 
Iran is aware of the importance of the regional dimension to its foreign policy. Therefore, Iran has exploited its 
resources and capabilities to expand its role in the Arab region by building a network of interests with some 
centers of power and political movements (Hezbollah, Houthis, Shiite militias in Iraq, Hamas and Islamic Jihad) 
through which it managed to influence the Arab political events. Iran succeeded in investing political events in 
the Arab region in two stages: the first stage after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by adopting a neutral position 
to satisfy the United States and the Arab regimes that supported it. It aimed to create a climate and incentive for 
Western countries, including the United States to develop its relations with Iran, and invested in the decline in 
the peace process and its stalemate between Palestinians and Israelis and American positions supporting Israel, 
to appear before the Arab public opinion as a party capable of defending the Palestinian cause, and its ability to 
confront. 
  The second is after the US occupation of Iraq in 2003, which strengthened its influence within the Iraqi state 
and the centers of political forces, and changed the balance of power in the region to its advantage and made it 
the largest regional force with an effective weight in the region.  This has reflected on its regional and 
international relations, and its relations with the Arab countries have been an important determinant of its foreign 
policy, due to the intertwining of strategic interests between them and the Gulf States (Makki, 2010: 22). 
  Iran has realized the regional dimensions of the Turkish role in the Arab region. The relations between them 
have been intertwined for hundreds of years. Consequently, the Turkish-Iranian relations are based on the long 
history of the Ottoman-Persian conflict for regional hegemony. Economy, and the conclusion of agreements 
between the two countries, but did not prevent Turkey from accusing the government and non-governmental 
sources of Iran's involvement in supporting the activities of radical Islamic organizations of Turkey, especially 
the Revolutionary Islamic Movement and branches of Hezbollah .These tensions led to the severing of relations 
between the two countries, but Turkey's concern not to escalate the tension after the US occupation of Iraq was 
in line with the following (Al-Sultani, Al-Shammari, 2015: 360) 
a) The two countries agree to reject the partition of Iraq. It is in Turkey's interest to work to contain the Kurdish 
issue and to not develop it, especially in light of the new developments related to the Syrian file. 
b) To establish an understanding between the two countries on security control in the border areas and exchange 
of information between the security forces of the two countries with regard to the tension on their common 
border. In light of the common interests of Iran and Turkey, Turkey has played an active role as a mediator in the 
Iranian-European crisis over the Iranian nuclear file and Iran's revolutionary projects and the ongoing 
confrontation with Western countries. Turkey has  a diplomatic, and influential role  in the Middle East and 
adopt a project for a modern civil Islamic state that  can be followed in the region. 
  In light of the regional importance of Iran and Turkey due to their economic and demographic strength, 
geographical location and its interrelationship with the peoples of the region and its countries. In light of the 
noticeable change in the balance of power that the Arab world is experiencing, it is clear that there is a real 
Iranian-Turkish relations and interests that will be translated into actual policies aimed at playing a pivotal and 
effective role In various Arab issues as Islamic issues of concern to the Muslim world as a whole and attempts to 
dissolve the region in an Islamic entity on the one hand and the Middle East on the other. Iran is in the regional 
equation existing in the Middle East a major force, due to its capabilities of economic, military and big 
population, and by other factors such as location - strategic. Turkey is also a regional power in light of the 
elements that have been presented previously 
  The Middle East region has historically been associated with an influential role for regional actors, especially 
Turkey and Iran. This has been linked to the perspective of international actors on the strategic importance of the 
Middle East region, its control of global shipping lines and its enormous economic wealth, especially oil. In this 
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way, Iran's foreign policy is based on the principle of "exporting the revolution" and the policy of the coalition. 
These alliances form the basis of the Iranian project in the Arab region. Since its Islamic revolution, it has sought 
to form alliances in different ways in order to rely on it in the implementation of its project. It is noted that Iran 
has maintained these patterns precisely since the outbreak of the war. The Iran-Hezbollah-Syria axis, the 
ideological pattern with the Shiites in the Arab world, and the economic pattern in its alliance with Russia, India, 
the Central Asian countries and others, while Turkey adopted a policy of alliances, cultural and political 
promotion of political project, which depends on the expansion of trade relations with the Arab countries, and 
consolidate its relations with Arab countries through  resolving political  problems an  reset, and its position on 
the Palestinian issue. 
Second: The nature of the political conflict in Syria 
The Syrian opposition has begun to show the developments of the Syrian crisis, represented by groups and 
individuals who demand regime change in Syria and oppose the Baath Party government. In 2011, some 
opposition groups in Syria followed a new path after the Syrian crisis. These groups united to form the Syrian 
National Coalition and gained international support. The opposition was recognized as a partner in the dialogue 
to get out of the Syrian crisis. Libya was the only country to recognize the Syrian National Coalition. A new 
opposition group was formed in 2012 under the name of the National Coalition of Revolutionary Forces and the 
Syrian Opposition. The GCC recognized it as the "legitimate representative of the Syrian people" and as 
"representative of the aspirations of the Syrian people" Arab countries. Syria's map became a military map, 
shared by three conflicting parties (the Syrian regime, the opposition and the Dai'sh organization). The military 
map on the ground in Syria became rapidly and thorny as well because of the division of areas between the 
conflicting parties. The Syrian opposition, represented by the Free Army and supported by the Nasra Front, is 
gaining control over areas in Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, Idlib, Ghouta al-Sharqiyah, Daraa and Hama, and the 
organization of the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham extended its control over several areas in Qamishli, Al- 
Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah militias on most of the major cities in the provinces (Aminu, 2014). 
  In the light of the existence of real political solutions, a state of crisis emerged in Syria due to the intertwining 
of the crisis, the multiple levels of regional and international conflict, and the lack of political initiatives. These 
suggested solutions include:  
  First: the conflict in Syria falls within three circles: regional and international conflict, regime conflict, popular 
revolution, and conflict against cross-border organizations. The regional and international conflict is 
characterized by continuity and conflict because of the conflicting interests and interests of international and 
regional actors. The crisis situation in Syria, which confirms the maturation of the climate of bonded 
convergence with regional and international conditions and data that help put forward an initiative to get out of 
the crisis (Muslim Brotherhood Conference in Brussels, 2011). 
  The conflict at the level of the opposing forces and the regime is more complex, given the complexity of the 
factors driving the continuity of the crisis. The opposition and the regime have revealed a series of conflicts that 
vary from region to region, four in the opposition and four in the regime. Conflicts associated with the 
opposition are: political conflict within the political opposition components based on different ideological and 
political rules, different international alliances, conflict with the regime and its militias, and the conflict of major 
military organizations among them fueled by ideological and political differences and military conflict within 
geographical unity. 
   The conflict between the political and military forces of the revolution and a possible social conflict with the 
supportive social environment, the causes of its outbreak being available, the struggle of economic interests 
among the warlords and a latent conflict with national and non-national militias fighting against its opponents 
Assad's regime recognizes that the idea of continuing war is a housing factor for the eruption of these conflicts, 
which excludes any response to any policy initiative for solution (Amino, 2014). 
  Second: The security equation in Syria which is characterized by a great overlap between the concepts of 
regional security and international security. has turned the Syrian territory from a purely popular revolution to a 
regional conflict interact components, and therefore the solution of the security equation in one way or another 
requires international or regional convergence at the least. The features that are linked to regional geopolitical 
files and with determinants imposed within the international community.  
 The third: Syrian opposition conference was held on June 28, 2011 under the slogan "Syria for all under a civil 
democratic state", which was based in Damascus. It was attended by 200 opposition and independent Syrian 
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figures. It was the first conference to be held since 1963 in Syria. on 4 July 2011, another conference was held in 
Damascus under the title "The Independent Parliamentarians Initiative for Modern Syria", in which 60 members 
of the People's Assembly participated. The participants considered six points for the possibility of 
implementation within 12 months, which Secures a shift towards a pluralistic democratic system. As a result of 
the events in al-Ghouta following the chemical weapons attack in August 2013, Syria joined an agreement 
confirming the destruction of chemical weapons declared. These weapons were removed and destroyed in 2014. 
The evidence suggests that the Syrian government launched a chlorine-bomb attack in three areas in northern 
Syria, this attack is a banned attack under the Chemical Weapons Convention, but Syria has not adhered to it (a 
Muslim Brotherhood conference in Brussels, 2011). 
Third: the Iranian-Turkish competition for influence in Syria: 
  The two countries sought to expand their influence in Syria, especially after the Syrian revolution in 2011, the 
developments in the conflict in Syria and the discovery of gas, which increased the competition between the two 
countries to play an active role in Syria. 
Iranian Influence in Syria: 
  Iran and Syria, after the Islamic revolution in Iran, sought to establish an alliance between the two countries. 
There are a number of factors that have formed permanent features and possible determinants of this alliance. 
The most important of these factors are as follows (Hussein, Khalidi 1997: 149) 
- The common interests of the two countries, and the vital role of the Shiites in Lebanon for both Syria and Iran, 
although the considerations are different for both sides. 
- Considerations relating to the regional balance of power, and maintaining the political and strategic interests of 
the two countries. 
- In the region of volatile and unstable alliances in the Middle East, the Syrian-Iranian relationship has proved 
more stable than any other relationship in the region. 
- Protection of the Shiite community in Syria and the protection of the holy places in it. 
Dimensions and mechanisms of Iranian intervention in Syria after 2011 
  Iran's vision of its relationship with Syria is based on two principles. First, Iran's conviction that the Syrian-
Iranian alliance could affect US projects in the Arab region. On the other hand, Iran is aware that its alliance 
with Syria as well as Palestinian groups and Hezbollah constitutes a united front against Israeli policies in the 
region. The second principle of rapprochement between the two countries is the existence of an international 
consensus on the isolation of Iran and Syria by the international and regional powers which has existed between 
the two countries since the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution of Iran to a very special relationship, at the 
expense of its position in the Arab system, despite the occurrence of occasional tensions in the Syrian-Iranian 
relations, especially Syria's support for a strong central government in Iraq, in addition to participating in the 
peace conference sponsored by The United States of America in Madrid in 1991, but both Damascus and Tehran 
have reduced their differences, Tehran is a reliable ally and of great importance to Syria (Zu'bi, 2009: 169) 
  Iran has recognized the strategic importance of strengthening its cooperation with Syria, as evidenced by the 
agreement of the two parties on a joint defense agreement between Tehran and Damascus, although this alliance 
began a tactic rather than a strategic pact. A major economic and trade agreement, including a cooperation 
agreement in the field of gas and oil and other agreements in the field of roads and electrical connections 
between Syria and Iran through Iraq (Zoubi, 2009: 172). 
  The economic relations between the two countries developed after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in the context of the political rapprochement between the Iranian and Syrian regimes against the backdrop of 
Iran's war with Iraq. Under this framework, Iran has pledged to export about 9 million tons of oil annually to 
Syria in return for the export of Syria between 300 to 400 Thousand tons of phosphate per year to Iran, and the 
development of the size of Iranian investments in Syria with the assumption of President Bashar al-Assad the 
ruling of Syria. The size of Iranian investments in Syria in 2006 reached to "more than 400 million dollars," and 
in 2012 as a result of the announcement of the two countries plans to expand Iranian projects in Syria, the size of 
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investments between the two countries reached to 10 billion dollars, while the Iranian exports to Syria during the 
year 2016 was approximately $ 29 million (Abdul Aziz, 2017). 
Iranian support policies for the Syrian regime (Bashar al-Assad) in light of the Syrian crisis: 
  Iran has adopted a number of key mechanisms to support the Syrian regime under the conflict in Syria, which 
began in 2011, the most important of which are: 
- Providing military and security consultations to Syrian regular forces 
  Iran's military support has emerged to protect the Syrian regime and to ensure that it does not fall as a major 
concern for Iran in the Arab region. Therefore, Iran has provided its expertise in the field of military consultation 
to the Syrian regular army by sending some military leaders to Syria, in addition to sending Shiite volunteers to 
participate in the conflict and urged Hezbollah to support the Syrian regime. 
  The first is to allow the members of Iranian volunteers under the title of defending the Shiite holy places, 
including the shrine of Sayeda Zeinab in Damascus. In this way, Iran sought to avoid direct involvement in the 
military conflict against the armed opposition forces. At least officially, to the Iranian security and military 
institutions, with the exception of some experts who played a prominent role in directing the course of military 
battles between the regular forces and the opposition forces? Iran has denied the claims of international and 
regional powers that have indicated an Iranian military presence in Syria. On February 25, 2014, Iranian Foreign 
Minister Mohammad Jawad Zarif confirmed that Iran had no military presence in Syria (Ankir, 2014). 
  The second was to participate in the establishment of Shiite militias, including Iraqi and Afghan elements, to 
contribute to the military battles against the opposition forces in Syria, where Iran supported the establishment of 
militias such as Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades, and behind the sending of elements belonging to organizations 
such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Brigade of Islam ", and" Badr Corps "of Iraq to fight in Syria. Iran also turned into a 
"corridor" for the transfer of some Afghan Shiites to Syria in order to support the Syrian regime's efforts in the 
face of opposition forces. Some estimates suggest that the number of militia elements that helped Iran train in 
Syria ranges from 30-40,000 belonging to different nationalities (Rabei, 2015). 
  The third was coordination with the Lebanese Hezbollah, which actively participated in the military 
confrontations against the armed opposition and played a prominent role in the regime's success in controlling 
the Qusair area for its strategic importance, as well as the Lebanese border, which was infiltrated by some 
opposition forces, Which has dealt many blows to many of the objectives of Hezbollah and Iran, Iran has been 
keen to move from its secret support to announce its public support for the Syrian regime, which can be 
interpreted in light of its desire to send many letters to the regional and international forces that support the 
Syrian opposition forces and seeks to Drop  Al Assad ( Ankeer, 2014). 
- Supporting the Syrian regime by rejecting the idea of forming a transitional governing body 
  Although Iran welcomes the efforts made by United Nations representative Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi and 
Stephane de Mistura to reach a settlement to the Syrian crisis, it has never supported the idea of forming a 
transitional governing body for several reasons, including: 
First, this idea was overtaken by the rapid events in Syria, which no longer correspond to the data imposed by 
the balance of power within Syria between the regime and the opposition forces, which tend in favor of the 
regime . That  was due the support received both militarily and financially by Iran and its allies of Shiite forces 
and organizations in  Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, or at the political level by Russia and China, which 
prevented condemnation of the Syrian regime by using the veto three times in the Security Council (Ankeer, 
2014). 
Second, it requires significant concessions by the Syrian regime, especially with regard to the removal of Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad, which is unacceptable to the power circles in Syria or Iran, in which the regime 
regained the lead from opposition forces facing a state of division and fragmentation has reduced its ability to 
drop it. 
Thirdly, Iran seeks to re-establish international legitimacy for the Syrian regime by emphasizing that it is an 
important party in the war against terrorism and specifically against the Da'ash organization (Rabei, 2015) 
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  As part of Iran's strategic and political aims, Iran has established ideological and political influence, adopting 
its first ties with the elite of the regime, businessmen, and cultural and popular events. Despite the problems and 
challenges faced by Iran's influence in Syria, Iran continued to grow in the field of economic cooperation with 
the regime. Where it created dozens of companies, and increased the size of Iranian investments in Syria in 
parallel with the escalation of political and cultural relations, which were the ambitions of Iran in the Syrian 
reality, and often expressed by Iranian officials openly and continuously. The Syrian revolution against the 
Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad was an important motive for Iran's influence inside Syrian territory. 
Iran aligned itself with Assad's regime in the face of the revolution of the Syrians and escalated its political, 
cultural and economic activities. Iran has become the decisive force in the regime's orientations, its political and 
decisions. Thus, Iranian influence has political, military, economic, social and cultural expressions based on 
Syrian territory. 
Turkish influence in Syria: 
  The relationship between Turkey and Syria entered into a period of reconciliation after the relations reached the 
stage of war at the end of 1998. The breakthroughs were the deterioration of the differences between Ankara and 
Damascus, which focused on a number of issues related to the geopolitical location and the regional role of 
Turkey and Syria. The most important of which are the Kurdish issue, the issue of sharing the Euphrates River, 
the issue of the Iskandarun Brigade, and the issue of the military-security alliance between Ankara and Tel Aviv.  
  The escalation of the Turkish-Syrian differences reached the conclusion of the two sides on 20/10/1998 for a 
security agreement called the "Adana Agreement" which ended the Turkish-Syrian crisis and opened the door for 
dialogue between the two countries. Damascus affirmed that it refused to allow the PKK, In exchange for 
Turkey's failure to allow any activity threatening Syria's stability from its territory in what was interpreted as a 
reference to Turkish-Israeli military cooperation. This agreement was described by Syrian Foreign Minister 
Faruq al-Shara as "balanced and a security agreement between two security committees. The security forces 
stopped by the Turkish side since the year 1995, and Syria started to deal with this crisis from a long-term 
strategic vision because we do not want Turkey to become an enemy of the Arabs. "Relations between the two 
countries improved before 2011, but these relations declined significantly because of Turkey's position on the 
Syrian revolution, and its demand for the departure of the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Zakaria, 2012: 23). 
  As the events in Syria after 2011 witnessed a major development in the Turkish position on the crisis in Syria, 
when Turkey began to declare that "the Syrian crisis has turned from an internal Syrian affair, to an internal 
Turkish affair," Turkey has indicated on more than one occasion that the continuation of what is happening in 
Syria will inflict more losses on Turkey than it bears on more than one level (Bakeer, 2013). 
  Turkey found itself in a real crisis of division. On the one hand, it did not want to take harsh measures against 
the Syrian regime. On the other hand, it found itself unable to compromise on with this regime. It was confronted 
with an international will with multiple goals and agendas. In particular, and still called for internationalization 
of the crisis and the repetition of the Libyan model. Turkey tried to distance itself by not being influenced by the 
Turkish popular pressure to escalate Ankara's anti-Syrian stance. 
   In view of the length of the overlapping border between Turkey and Syria (more than 800 km), and the 
interrelationship between the peoples of the two countries, familial, cultural and social, Turkey is afraid that the 
Syrian escalation will plunge it into refugees, and thus the Syrian problem will move into Turkey. Turkey has 
therefore set up camps across the Turkish Red Crescent within Turkish territory, with many obligations. The 
Turkish forces entered Turkish airspace and the international coalition forces in Syria for the first time since the 
outbreak of the conflict in August 2016 to the border town of "Jrables " to liberate it from the terrorist 
organizations that control it, foremost among them the organization "Dai'sh" and the "Democratic Union" As an 
extension of the PKK, which is one of the most important organizations hostile to the Turkish state. Indeed, the 
process of the Turkish "Euphrates" aimed to control of the city, but it continued to prevent the establishment of 
"Kurdish belt growing" along the Turkish-Syrian border, which extends from Afreen to Qamishli in northern 
Syria, which is the target of the Kurdish forces that seek to control this border region to cut off Turkish relations 
Turkomans in Syria, as well as their desire to address aid flowing across the Turkish border to the organization 
of "Dai'sh". The hidden goal of this process is the city of "Al Babb ", which is a third of the Kurds and the focus 
of Kurdish attention after the confrontation of the "Dai'sh" in "Manbj" and indeed the city was subjected to 
several raids by Turkish forces in early 2017. The Turkish move in Syria comes in the context of curbing the 
Kurdish influence to prevent it from exploiting the situation in Syria so as not to call for independence, which is 
a direct threat to Turkey, and called for Turkey to establish an area known as the "safe zone" in northern Syria 
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with a depth of more than 35 km and Length 110 km, extending from the town of "Jrables" to the town of "Izz 
Az "to reach the town of" Deir Hofer "of the city of Al Babb (Abdel Aziz, 2017). 
  The Iranian-Turkish dispute was deepened in the disrespect of the Iranian regime and sectarian militias to the 
ceasefire agreement signed between the opposition and the Syrian regime in Turkey on December 30, 2016. Iran 
also rejects Turkish demands to remove all foreign organizations and militias, including Hezbollah from Syria In 
contrast, Turkey supports the Syrian opposition and believes that stability and political transition cannot take 
place in the presence of Bashar Assad,  who  is responsible for the killing of more than 600 thousand Syrians and 
the displacement of half the population of Syria, and therefore the tension between Ankara and Tehran will have 
a profound impact on The conflict in Syria will have an impact on Turkish-Iranian relations in the future (Al-
Sawy, 2017). 
  Turkey and Iran have political, economic and security interests in Syria. Both sides are working to expand their 
influence in Syria by supporting Iran's regime, while Turkey supports the Syrian opposition. , Especially after 
Iran joined both Russia and Turkey in the Astana talks to resolve the Syrian crisis, the differences between the 
Turks and the Iranians in Syria was  gradually surfaced, and tension between Turkey and Iran emerged in the 
fourth round of the Geneva negotiations (4)The Iranian side does not recognize the Geneva reference, especially 
the political transition in Syria, which leads to the formation of a transitional government and an end to the rule 
of the Assad family, which is strongly rejected by the politicians of the Iranian regime, while supporting the 
decisions of Geneva (1)and rejects the idea of remaining Bashar Al Assad in ruling Syria. 
Despite the success of Iran and Turkey over the past six years to neutralize their differences on the conflict in 
Syria, but when it appeared that there is an international trend and regional support for a political settlement of 
the Syrian crisis, these differences are back to the forefront again, which was evident both during the Turkish 
tripartite talks  regarding Iranian-Russian relations on 20 December 2016, or during the bilateral Turkish-Russian 
negotiations that ended with the declaration of a cease-fire. Here, it is possible to say that these differences 
reached maturity, in a way that no longer with the policy of containment or neutralization is gaining importance 
and special relevance in the vision of both Tehran and Ankara. However, this does not mean that the Iranian 
escalation against Turkey will reach an unprecedented stage especially that despite Tehran's displeasure with 
Turkish politics - cannot risk entering into open conflict with Turkey, at least at the current stage (Okasha, 2016). 
  Although senior Iranian officials welcomed Russia's efforts in cooperation with Turkey to bolster the chances 
of success in the Astana negotiations aimed at strengthening the Russian-Turkish ceasefire agreement of 30 
December 2016, this does not negate the many concerns of  Iran  which is imposed by the high level of 
understandings ongoing Russian-Turkish, and undoubtedly the cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the 
fight against a duel in the city of  Al Babb  heightened the fears of Iran, as this could expand the scope of the role 
and influence of Turkey in Syria, especially with reports which Suggest that Turkey is seeking to ensure the 
maintenance of a military presence in the city of Al Babb even after the end of military operations launched by 
the forces of the Euphrates, which received the support of Russia represented in the air strikes launched by 
Russia against the sites of the dailies. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, 2017 Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan expressed his position on Iran's expansionist role, criticizing Iran's policy in Syria: «Tehran pursues a 
policy of Persian expansion and adopted expansionist policy based on Persian nationalism», continuing: «Iran 
wants to penetrate in Arab countries to form a Persian force», That his country «will not allow diligences  
territory from Syria for the benefit of other countries », which led to a strong negative Iranian reactions to the 
Turkish position (Abu – Sa'da, 2017). 
Conclusion: 
  Turkish-Iranian relations and interests have been intertwined for hundreds of years. This has made 
contemporary Turkish-Iranian relations based on the long history of the Ottoman-Persian conflict for regional 
hegemony. The balanced nature of this conflict provided the basis for balanced relations that are described as 
neither intimate nor hostile. While taking into account the interests of the other side, despite the development of 
Turkish-Iranian relations, especially in the field of economy, and expansion of areas of economic cooperation 
and trade, this did not prevent Turkey from accusing Iran of involvement in supporting the Turkish extremist of 
Islamic organizations, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, and branches of the Hezbollah 
organization, training and funding of these elements in the Iranian camps. 
  Turkey has pursued a double policy dominated by political deception. It has joined the US-led international 
coalition against Da'ish, which has colluded with it from the outset and supplied it with weapons. The Turkish 
parties are the biggest buyers and marketers of cheap oil sold by Damascus from Syrian and Iraqi wells. Moscow 
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has already issued a strong warning to Ankara that Russian airliners will bomb all the centers through which 
foreign fighters who join "Dai'sh", if the Turkish government allowed fighters to cross the border. Ankara is also 
coordinating with Riyadh and Doha to increase the military support of the Syrian armed opposition to counter 
Russian military intervention. Iran has been a major driving force on Syrian territory. Revolutionary Guards, 
Hezbollah and Abu Fadl al-Abbas militias have supported the Syrian regime but have failed to save it. Is not able 
to withstand, it turned out in the pursuit of the truce Zabadani and the towns of Foa and Kafriya, which in turn 
increased the burdens of the Russian side, and thus opened the way to limit the Iranian role. 
The Results of the study: 
The study concluded the following results: 
  The study sought to ascertain the validity of the hypothesis that "there is a correlation between the Turkish and 
Iranian political interests in Syria and the positions of the two states on the developments of the political conflict 
in Syria during the period (2011-2017)" where Iran seeks to strengthen the strength of the Syrian regime and its 
role in Syria at the expense of the Syrian opposition supported by Turkey, which seeks to reduce the Kurds in 
northern Syria, and reduce the conflict in its borders with Syria in addition to the problem of Syrian refugees in 
Turkey, hence the conflict in Syria has formed a specific geo-strategic position  in Turkish-Iranian relations. 
- The ideological differences affected the levels of Iranian-Turkish competition in the Arab region during the 
study period. Iran is working according to a doctrinal policy based on a sectarian basis according to the vision of 
the Shiite authorities, thus helping to export its revolution to neighboring countries in the Arab region. 
- The Syrian crisis contributed to the spread of Iranian-Turkish relations, according to the differences on the 
crisis. The crisis created a state of dissonance between the two regional countries. Both have their interests in the 
Arab world. Therefore, the events of the "Arab Spring" which made a complex geostrategic reality in the Middle 
East have emerged mainly in the competition between Turkey and Iran. 
- There is a Russian-Turkish rejection of the Iranian military progress because they understand the Iranian desire 
to declare strategic victory and control areas of influence that contradict the interests of Russia and Turkey, in 
addition to the outbreak of Russian-Iranian differences that would not allow Russia to expand Iran at the expense 
of its interests in Syria, that  is Iran  governed by obedience to Russian accounts. Iran is facing difficult choices. 
The clash with the Russian role will put it in a confrontation with everyone without exception, and will therefore 
respect everything that maintains its relationship with Moscow in order to avoid a major loss 
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